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ABSTRACT 
 
On 23 September 2010, the government of Taiwan moved closer to establishing a 
legislative framework for the negotiation of power sharing agreements with the 
nation's aboriginal groups when the Cabinet decided to approve the Indigenous 
Peoples Self-Government Act. Although the Act still awaits passage by the 
Legislature, many stakeholders in aboriginal self-rule are optimistic about this 
latest move. Others say the legislation lacks teeth. In many of its policy initiatives, 
the ROC government has looked abroad for a blueprint, and Canada is the 
Western country that is often promoted as a viable model to follow in this regard. 
The purpose of this paper is to contrast the historical and cultural influences of 
each nation's relationship with its indigenous population and, given these 
variances, identify potential roadblocks to Taiwan's successful implementation of 
a viable mechanism for deriving aboriginal self-government agreements based on 
the Canadian example, as well as to propose policy recommendations on what 
direction relevant legislation should take.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The advancement of many aboriginal peoples in terms of self-government 
witnessed in many countries is a relatively new paradigm in terms of the 
state's relations with those it governs. It reflects a larger shift in ideology 
concerning the roles of political participation and the role of the state. In the 
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West, despite these advancements, the process is far from complete. Indeed, 
it must be a task without end—an ongoing, ever morphing evolution in 
political governance. Despite this relative newness, countries like Canada, 
which in many ways is on the forefront of decolonisation and power-
sharing, should not be considered experimental tinkerers, but pioneers that 
have much to offer by way of experience. In many ways, Taiwan is far 
behind Western countries in this regard, yet the situation is far from dire; 
Taiwan is arguably a leader among Asian nations in terms of recognising 
aboriginal rights, and the country's indigenous population is today on the 
cusp of greater autonomy. To what degree should policymakers look to the 
Canadian example is the focus of this paper.  
In order to appreciate how the current regimes in Canada and Taiwan 
operate, a brief examination of the historical forces that led to them must be 
made. This is followed by an analysis of some of the forces peculiar to  
the Taiwanese experience that could serve as obstacles to implementation             
of a Canadian-style procedure, and finally, a discussion of policy 
recommendations.  
The Republic of China (ROC) was the national government of all of 
China that came into being in 1911 after the fall of the Ch’ing Dynasty 
(1644–1911). It acquired Taiwan in 1945 after the Japanese defeat in World 
War II, and it relocated to Taiwan in 1949, becoming at once government in 
exile and an occupying power. The term "Taiwanese" refers to the people of 
Han Chinese ethnicity who settled in Taiwan during the steady migration, 
primarily from the coastal provinces of China, that began about 400 years 
ago. The term "mainlander" refers to the people, also of Han Chinese 
ethnicity, who moved to Taiwan in the late 1940s to escape the communists, 
most accompanying the Kuomintang (KMT) government and ROC. To 
many Taiwanese, the term "Kuomintang regime" was synonymous with that 
period of dictatorship and Stalinist-inspired one-party rule and has been 
likened to a foreign occupation, while its own adherents believed it was the 
rightful inheritor of the mandate of heaven and therefore the legitimate ruler 
of all of China. During Taiwan's democratisation, the KMT evolved into 
what it is today—a bona fide political party in the country's multi-party 
system.  
The liberal opposition to the KMT and its main contender in the 
nation's elections is the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which was in 
power from 2000 to 2008. Its platform traditionally includes issues such as 
human rights and anti-corruption, and its adherents generally favour a 
Taiwanese identity. It has been accused of promoting Taiwanese 
independence, whereas critics charge that the KMT is bringing the island 
too quickly into the Chinese sphere of influence.  
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The notion of looking to an example like that of Canada's to help 
chart the course of a new relationship between the aboriginal peoples and 
the central government in Taiwan is not unprecedented. The country has a 
record of importing policies and systemic developments from developed 
countries, specifically Western ones. In the economic sphere, the ROC 
government has always referred to a number of Western economic models. 
Legislatively, the KMT regime followed the example set by Meiji Japan 
when it adopted Western, especially German, legal codes in the late 1920s 
and 1930s, making the ROC's legal canon somewhat Western-oriented with 
a content influenced greatly by Japanese jurisprudence (Wang 2002: 531). 
Even the ROC Constitution is modeled after constitutional concepts 
borrowed from the United States. Moreover, KMT leaders borrowed many 
methods of social control and administration from the Soviet Union, which 
was seen as an ideal model, preferable to the formula employed by the 
Chinese Communists. With the help of Chiang Ching-kuo, who studied 
communism in Russia and was later held there in exile, the KMT imported 
Soviet models for the creation of a Stalinist bureaucracy to rule over the 
ROC. Given this track record, it is not surprising that in tackling the difficult 
issue of aboriginal self-determination, the government should look abroad 
for inspiration.  
There are many possible sources of guidance from Western countries 
that have found workable power-sharing agreements with their aboriginal 
populations. These can be found in the United States, for example, where 
executive power over the Navajo Reservation is held by a "Tribal Council," 
or in New Zealand, which has developed a system of biculturalism and 
sharing of power between its Maori and British-descended ethnic 
populations. These and other examples from the West are worthy of study, 
but they are sufficiently different from the situation in Taiwan that their 
implementation would be problematic at best. The Canadian experience, 
especially at the territorial level, appears to be an attractive teacher for 
Taiwanese students of aboriginal self-rule.  
There are already considerable, if unofficial, ties between the 
indigenous populations of Canada and Taiwan. In 1998, the Canadian Trade 
Office signed a memorandum of understanding with Taiwan's Council of 
Indigenous Peoples. In May 2002, respected Canadian Native leader Elijah 
Harper led a delegation of First Nations representatives and performers on a 
friendship tour of Taiwan, where they were guests of honour at the launch 
of Taiwan's Aboriginal Media Association.  
It must be remembered that any policy recommendation based on the 
experience of another country cannot be imported wholesale, but must be 
altered to suit the unique characteristics of the country in question. This is 
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especially true of the Canadian and Taiwanese examples, whose histories 
and dominant cultures are still sufficiently different to warrant careful 
analysis prior to emulation. In the Canadian example, which has a history of 
treaty negotiations, there was a common conception on both sides of the 
negotiating table that the power-holders representing the government were 
the inheritors of the deeds of the oppressors, while those representing 
aboriginal interests were in the position of aggrieved party. In Taiwan, 
however, there are various sub-ethnic and ethnic groups including the 
majority that each, in its way, considers itself to be the oppressed party. This 
is a perception on not only the individual but also the societal level that can 
muddy the waters of a true appreciation of the historical relationship that 
exists between negotiating parties.  
One of the two main sub-ethnic groups on Taiwan are the Taiwanese 
with roots on the island that go back between 300 and 400 years. It is 
members of this group, and others that sympathise with its conception of 
history, that are trying to form a Taiwanese consciousness on the island 
distinct from Chinese consciousness. In their view, they are only recently 
emerging from a century of oppression: first at the hands of the Japanese 
colonisers, and then at the hands of another "foreign" occupying force, the 
KMT. It was during the Japanese colonial period that a sense of Taiwanese 
identity first emerged in its infancy—as distinct from the people's view of 
themselves as Chinese. For one thing, Taiwanese people were being 
assimilated into Japanese culture by the policies of the day, and there was an 
ever-present cognition of the distinction between the ruled and the rulers. 
Identifying themselves in opposition to their oppressors, the Taiwanese 
people could have chosen to embrace the notion of Chinese identity, but it 
was also well known that their predicament of being under Japanese control 
was a direct result of having been cast aside by China when the Ch'ing 
Court ceded the island in perpetuity to the Japanese empire in 1895. This, 
plus the distinct cultural differences that had evolved over the centuries of 
their separation from China, was forged into a sense of Taiwanese identity 
in the fire of Japanese occupation.  
In terms of nation building, there is a definite contrast between areas 
where aboriginal populations form a regional minority of the population and 
areas where they are in the majority. The examples in Canada of this 
dichotomy are Yukon's First Nations in the former case, and Nunavut in the 
latter. The development of nation building in Arctic Canada followed the 
conventional pattern experienced in Europe, with a period of state formation 
and consolidation of territory followed by cultural integration and 
standardisation (Rokkan 1999: 58). In the modern era, the concept of human 
rights and the precepts of democracy have contributed to deviations from 
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this pattern, with differing results depending on political systems and 
historical forces. In the far north, nation building was a process by which 
diffused populations became connected through the institution of new 
political structures. This process can lead to closer ties between a political 
system and the people it serves. In today's world, with advanced 
communications and transportation systems, this relation is an even closer 
one, with the center of federal power even more closely integrated with the 
far-flung populations whose lives its actions and decisions affect. The 
process can also lead to greater communication within communities in vast 
territories the likes of which are seen in Canada's north, and hence to greater 
social cohesion (Bakvis 1981: 45).  
The conflict of the center versus the periphery takes on especially 
relevant importance given the geographical characteristics of the Canadian 
example. As Canada is the world’s second-largest nation by territorial 
holdings and with only a population of some 33 million (most of whom are 
concentrated near the southern border with the United States), issues such as 
the strengthening of political citizenship, efficient use of resources and the 
provision of public welfare take on special urgency.  
The official policy toward minorities for much of Canadian history 
has therefore been one of non-recognition of Indian sovereignty and the 
state assuming a paternalistic and ward-guardian role (Cote 2001: 15). In 
reaction to this, minority groups such as aborigines have appropriated the 
concept of nation building and used it to refer to their struggle for 
autonomy, which includes efforts to create the institutions of self-rule. The 
task was a difficult one, as the forces of history can be difficult to overcome. 
The patterns of governmental responses to calls for self-rule indicate that 
they are becoming somewhat standardised. For one, areas in which 
aborigines constitute regional minorities appear to have tended toward 
favouring the adoption of dual governmental systems. One of the difficulties 
inherent in negotiating these power-sharing arrangements has been finding 
appropriate avenues for the expression within the sub-national ruling 
structure of the unique history and culture of the minority group, and to 
incorporate these characteristics into their legal status. Because sub-national 
governmental units are established under laws that follow the Western legal 
tradition, and are protected under Western constitutional models, they tend 
to mirror traditional Western governmental structures in their makeup, and 
the unique aspects of the local cultures may therefore not be reflected 
therein. Nevertheless, in practice, the operation and use of the political 
bodies often adopts traditional social patterns of interaction and hierarchical 
systems, thereby finding an outlet for the expression of the minority group's 
unique identity. This is true whether or not the self-rule structure adopted 
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was one following the public-government model or one closer to a self-
government arrangement.  
Canada encompasses examples of both these paths in the Yukon and 
Nunavut patterns, which differ in salient ways. Nunavut, for example, is an 
area where aboriginal persons make up the majority of the population, and a 
public government arrangement was adopted in the form of the new 
territory's legislative assembly (Catt and Murphy 2002: 55). In this and 
similar cases, all persons regardless of ethnicity are eligible to take part in 
the political life of the territory, including municipal governments and 
political-party involvement. By contrast, the Yukon is an area in which sub-
ethnic groups form the minority of the population, and it follows the  
pattern of adopting a self-government arrangement, forming dual, often 
overlapping, governmental authority within the territory. The Yukon First 
Nations arrangements include the mandate to enact laws and adjudicate 
disputes in ways that respect the cultural beliefs and values held by the 
members of the governed population. It is significant that arrangements like 
the latter generally take the form of flexible governmental structures that 
can develop and evolve in such a way that they come, over time, to better 
mirror that culture's values and identity. Because the Yukon's demographic 
factors more closely approximate the Taiwanese experience, it is this latter 
model that has more direct relevance.  
In the example of the Yukon First Nations arrangement, the self-
governmental unit is empowered to pass laws that apply throughout the 
geographical boundary of the Yukon Territory to all First Nations persons, 
as well as laws that apply to all persons regardless of ethnicity in settlement 
areas that come exclusively under the territorial jurisdiction of the First 
Nations government structure. In cases where First Nations laws and federal 
laws may conflict, extensive negotiation is required to determine which 
shall take precedence, lest jurisdictional conflicts threaten the efficient 
operation of what has been created.  
What is important for policymakers to keep in mind when examining 
the system that led to the Yukon agreements, or indeed any other Canadian 
system, for clues to their own institution building is that they must not, as in 
the previous cases cited, import entire systems while making only cosmetic 
changes. Rather, it is the spirit of the process that could be emulated, 
allowing the details to assume a distinctly Taiwanese flavour. It is the 
mechanism and process by which power-sharing agreements are reached 
between the federal and provincial governments and First Nations political 
organisations that may hold the key to how to proceed, and not the contents 
of those agreements themselves. Moreover, no legislation or government 
initiative exists in a vacuum. Policymakers must develop an appreciation for 
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the differences as well as the similarities of the Canadian and Taiwanese 
examples. They must also look at the historical and social forces that have 
led to the current situations in order to understand not only why they work, 
but in some cases, why they do not.  
 
 
DIFFERENCES AS OBSTACLES 
 
Historically, governmental relations with aboriginal or other ethnic 
minorities have been characterised by a raft of distasteful mechanisms, 
including genocide, deportation, oppression and assimilation. These 
responses are increasingly seen as illegitimate in today's modern 
democracies. Indeed, part and parcel of this change of policy on the part of 
Western governments with regards to dealing with aboriginal claims has 
been a wholesale acceptance of the majority's culpability in these 
inappropriate actions on the part of the state, and a desire to redress past 
wrongs on the basis that the marginalisation of aboriginal peoples is no 
longer considered acceptable (Young 1995: 260).  
In Canada, serious effort is being made to popularise the 
understanding that the First Nations were oppressed as a matter of course 
for much of the nation's existence. This widespread acknowledgement of the 
sins of the past has led to the emergence among the mainstream population 
of a culture of restitution, which has in no small part paved the way for a 
desire to redress historical wrongs vis-à-vis the treatment of aboriginal 
people by the government. The question remains, however, whether such a 
culture could arise in Taiwan, and if so, whether it would lead to similar 
results.  
One of the obstacles to this is the differing conception on the 
continuity of power held by the people of Taiwan compared to the 
mainstream in Canada. In Canada, there is a multiparty system that 
nevertheless is part of a continuity of government. In contrast, the 
conception in Taiwan seems to be one of a change of regimes. That is to 
say, in Western democracies, there is an acceptance of the alternation of 
power-holding on the part of two or more parties, whereas in Taiwan, the 
2000 presidential election was widely seen by both sides of Taiwan's unique 
political spectrum as the end of one era and the beginning of another, rather 
than a placeholder arrangement. The same occurred in 2008, with another 
transfer of power, and yet another popular conception of the end of one 
regime and beginning of another. This is largely the result of China's history 
of dynastic succession and inexperience with the ebb and flow of 
democratic power-holding arrangements.  
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As a result, a party taking power may not feel responsible for the 
historical policies of the power recently dethroned, and may therefore not 
attempt to redress many of its wrongs with the same zeal that would come if 
it were complicit in them. Indigenous groups initiating negotiations with a 
DPP government, for example, might find that the government, while eager 
to be seen as doing something constructive and rights-driven, does not 
approach the problem from the point of view of a former oppressor, as the 
sub-ethnic group from which the DPP derives its main support do not 
conceive of themselves as former oppressors, but as former members of an 
oppressed population.  
That is not to say that the KMT is solely responsible for the state of 
aboriginal affairs in Taiwan today. Much had to do with the Japanese 
colonial government, and even further back in history with the reign of 
Koxinga and the subsequent period of Ch’ing domination. Political forces 
during the DPP's 8-year tenure have arguably done more to destigmatise the 
aboriginal identity than any regime in the past 400 years, but if the average 
ROC citizen does not feel obligated to make good on past wrongs to the 
island’s aboriginal inhabitants, then there will be little political currency or 
widespread grassroots impetus for such actions. As a result, the form that 
Taiwan's aboriginal renaissance took during the Chen years was not one of 
restitution or equalisation borne of a sense of culpability and equality, but 
one of increased attention based on a feeling of shared deprivation at the 
hands of a common oppressor.  
This conception is no less valid, however, but it would make the 
Canadian model harder to follow because certain motivating factors are 
absent, or at the very least, different. It is also potentially problematic 
because the concept of the power holders (that of a common history of 
oppression) may not be shared by the indigenous minority. Many members 
of the latter group, far from seeing the ethnic Taiwanese as cousins in 
oppression by the KMT, sees them as their erstwhile opponents going back 
to the initial period of the settlement of Taiwan. The first wave of Han 
Chinese immigrants that arrived on the island 400 years ago, and the 
subsequent waves that have arrived since, were the ones who appropriated 
aboriginal land, assimilated the people of the low-lying areas, and pushed 
surviving groups into territories previously unfamiliar to them, uprooting 
groups and creating an imbalance of the tribe-based political delineation of 
the island's geography that had developed over thousands of years.  
The mechanics of decentralising power to identity groups is more 
complicated than it might at first seem. Two aspects of this process are of 
particular importance, especially in the post-war period in the West: those of 
degrees of territoriality and asymmetry. Basing power-decentralisation 
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measures entirely on territoriality typically involves regionalisation. Sub-
national regions benefit from decentralisation by being accorded certain 
decision-making powers according to the principle that all the inhabitants of 
a particular territory have the same rights, regardless of ethnicity. Using an 
asymmetric mechanism, by contrast, inhabitants of one region may find that 
they have more or different rights than those in other territorialities, simply 
because of their ethnic identities or membership in another identity group. 
The former is an example of the jus solis principle, and the latter, the jus 
sanguinis principle. In Canada, the method by which aboriginal claims are 
dealt with has led to a system that has characteristics of both territoriality 
and asymmetry, but countries generally operate on a principle that is 
distinctly either jus solis or jus sanguinis.  
The jus solis principle, simply put, means a person's nationality, or 
identity, is dependent on where he was born. The jus sanguinis principle, in 
contrast, assigns identity on the basis of blood heritage. In most of Europe, 
for example France, Holland, Sweden and the United Kingdom, they rely on 
the jus solis, as do Canada and the United States. In these nations, 
citizenship is largely determined by place of birth. Germany, on the other 
hand, retains even today a philosophy of jus sanguinis. This is largely a relic 
of the creation of the modern German state. Though antiquated, this "law of 
the blood" is carried on even today, where the German identity is based              
on race. Those with German ancestry are easily conferred German                
citizenship regardless of acculturation, whereas second and third-generation 
descendents of immigrants, though born in Germany, have a difficult task 
obtaining such citizenship (Pribic 2004: 51).  
The prevailing of these two competing philosophies can help predict 
the mechanism a state will employ in dealing with ethnic minorities. For 
example, if a state is given to employing a jus sanguinis philosophy, it is 
more likely to employ an asymmetric mechanism of power decentralisation 
in which inhabitants of an area enjoy different rights or responsibilities than 
those in other areas due to their ethnicity. This is often divorced from a 
commitment to multiculturalism as employed, for example, in Canada. The 
risk being that absent an acceptance of cultural diversity within a single 
nation, there is a tendency to disregard the cultural pluralism and traditional 
methods of community governance in favour of one imposed from the top 
down. In Taiwan's case, this would fail to meet the individual needs of its 
many different aboriginal groups.  
States that are more jus solis in nature tend to be ones that have a 
commitment to multiculturalism, and they tend to institute power-sharing 
agreements on the basis of territoriality and regionalisation. Using this 
paradigm, regions are imbued with decision-making powers such that all the 
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region's inhabitants enjoy the same rights, regardless of ethnicity. The 
pattern that Taiwan will follow is predictable and depends on whether the 
society, and therefore by extension the state's policies, follows the jus 
sanguinis or jus solis principle. But how do we determine this?  
A good indicator of whether a nation operates on a principle of jus 
solis or jus sanguinis is its citizenship laws. The legislative codification of 
who is and is not allowed to be considered a member of the group is directly 
influenced by the prevailing conception in that society of membership and 
how it is achieved. According to a study by the US Office of Personnel 
Management, which compiled information on the citizenship laws of most 
of the world's countries, the Republic of China confers citizenship according 
to the principle of jus sanguinis. The defining piece of legislation is the 
Nationality Law of the Republic of China, enacted in 1929, which stipulates 
that citizenship is based on descent from the father, except in cases where 
the father is unknown or stateless, but where the mother is an ROC citizen. 
In other words, being born in Taiwan does not necessarily, in and of itself, 
automatically confer citizenship rights, but only if the father is an ROC 
citizen. This applies regardless of the nationality of the mother, or in certain 
situations whether or not the child is born out of wedlock. The law was 
amended in 2000 to allow transmission of citizenship through either parent, 
but a strong patrilineal tendency in Taiwanese society continues to 
dominate. Clearly, Taiwan is very much a jus sanguinis society.  
How does this affect aboriginal relations with the government? It 
suggests that government negotiators will tend to favour an asymmetric 
power-sharing mechanism, whether or not they would be conscious of this 
predisposition. Under this sort of arrangement, people living in certain 
regions may end up possessing more or fewer rights than those in other 
regions by virtue of their ethnic identities, as decision-making powers would 
be decentralised based on a conception of asymmetry, characterised by 
individuals in some areas possessing more rights to self-rule than 
individuals in other areas. Because this is inconsistent with the Canadian 
conception of jus solis, it suggests that the Canadian experience might be a 
difficult model to follow, at least insofar as inculcating society-wide 
acceptance of multiculturalism and acceptance of diversity. It does, 
however, bolster the argument for examining the process employed to arrive 
at the Yukon First Nations agreements, which followed an asymmetric 
model of adopting a dual-government pattern. It is also consistent with the 
Taiwanese consideration of aboriginal identity as a function of the 
individual's bloodline, whether or not he is conferred official recognition of 
this heritage.  
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It should be noted in this context that, during the struggle to create a 
uniquely Taiwanese identity that began in the 1980s, genetic studies were 
widely cited as proving that up to 80 percent of non-mainlander Taiwanese 
had some aboriginal blood and therefore, it was claimed, shared in the 
genetic inheritance of the island (Weller 2000). Former President Lee Teng-
hui was among their number. Of course, there was a political component to 
this claim, deriving from competing visions of group identity in Taiwan, 
which is a dynamic that cannot be ignored.  
 
 
IDENTITY 
 
Although there are many commonalities, there are certain conditions that 
were characteristic of the Canadian example that are not present in the 
Taiwanese example. Perhaps, the most important of these is the fact that the 
various levels of government in Canada with which the indigenous 
negotiators dealt had a firm position with respect to their own autonomy and 
sovereignty. This political stability does not exist in Taiwan, and although it 
does not necessarily impact directly the relationship between government 
and aboriginal groups, it can have a tremendous influence on the substance 
of negotiations and the conception of whether or not the central government 
truly has a mandate to forge such agreements.  
Taiwan, per se, is not a country as Canada is. The Republic of China 
on Taiwan is recognised by about a score of countries and is routinely 
denied accession and association with the world's international organisations 
as a result of its complicated relationship with the PRC. The vast majority of 
world policy on the Taiwan question includes adherence to a "one China" 
policy, which generally recognises Beijing's claim that Taiwan is a province 
of the PRC. It was only thanks to Taiwan's strong economy that these 
countries were compelled to find ways to establish unofficial ties with the 
island in order to trade with it, but political recognition was never part of 
such arrangements.  
Given this precarious arrangement, there is also the ever-present 
possibility that the government in Taipei will cease to exist if Beijing 
decides to actively assert its claims over the island. Whether by force of 
arms or through political manipulation, the manner is irrelevant. What is 
important is that, given the PRC’s size and ever-growing military and 
economic might, that possibility is becoming less and less unrealistic. This 
affects not only the perception of indigenous rights negotiators but the ROC 
officials with whom they would be negotiating.  
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For much of the KMT rule over Taiwan, it was an accepted 
proposition that the seat of the ROC government being located in Taipei 
was meant to be a short-term state of affairs. The aim, in the early days, was 
always to retake the mainland and leave as quickly as they had come, 
leaving the administration of the island in the hands of the provincial 
government, which operated in parallel with the central government until its 
dissolution in 1998. Although this is no longer the prevailing worldview, its 
legacy still permeates much of Taiwanese political culture and its 
administrative structures.  
More than just a political or ideological dichotomy, this phenomenon 
has given rise to competing views on what it means to be Taiwanese. As 
mentioned earlier, there are two distinct views of identity that are vying for 
prominence on the island at the present time. One faction espouses the 
notion that Taiwanese are a subset of the Chinese identity, and that while 
politically, Taiwan may or may not be part of China, certainly the majority 
of people on the island are ethnically Han Chinese. The other prefers to self-
identify with an emerging sense of being Taiwanese, divorcing itself from 
the larger Chinese culture to form a dynamic new conception of Taiwanese 
identity that, though it borrows heavily from its Chinese heredity, is 
sufficiently different in substantial ways as to merit its own unique subclass.  
Cultural leaders with their own agendas have used different 
interpretations of Taiwanese history to advance those agendas (Hsiau 2000). 
Today, these competing visions of national identity play out their expression 
in the culture war. On one side, the mainlander faction sees Taiwan as part 
of China and goes to great lengths to organise events and exhibitions that 
celebrate the images and values of Chinese culture, and to emphasise the 
line of continuity from the ancient China of thousands of years ago to the 
Han Chinese people of Taiwan today. This faction, which currently holds 
power and has been the dominant power broker for much of the post-
Japanese-colonial period, is collaborating in this effort with forces across 
the strait. The PRC does not want to risk alienation in the international 
community by launching an exercise in military adventurism in order to 
annex Taiwan. Therefore, it must compel the Taiwanese to willingly give 
themselves over to the center of the Chinese world: Beijing. To do this, the 
PRC knows that the emerging sense of Taiwanese identity is a threat, and it 
spares no expense to help its allies on the island to win the culture war and 
consolidate a widespread sense of Chinese identity in Taiwan.  
On the other side, the new Taiwanese, whose political expression is 
accreted in the pan-green coalition of political parties that, directly or 
indirectly, support Taiwanese sovereignty and presumably eventual 
independence from China. Proponents of this camp organise cultural and 
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social exhibitions and events that aim to inculcate a widespread sense of 
pride in Taiwan and everything that distinguishes the island from China. 
Although it is this camp that represents the most likely ally for aboriginal 
forces hoping to negotiate a political power-sharing agreement, it is also this 
camp that has all but appropriated the images and identities of the 
Taiwanese aboriginal groups for its own use (Simon 2006). 
The problem for aboriginal relations with the larger society rests in 
the fact that society at large does not have a clear conception of its own 
identity, and can therefore hardly be expected to develop a relationship with 
a minority group that is concise and symbiotic. The Taiwanese do not yet 
know who they are, so how can they know how they relate to others?  
There is also the risk that the aboriginal identity could be steamrolled 
over by the Taiwanese drive to develop its own identity. Ironically, while 
previous governments from Koxinga to the KMT have tried to eliminate 
aboriginal culture through assimilation into the larger whole, the emerging 
Taiwanese power brokers now appear to be trying to appropriate aboriginal 
culture to their own ends. While this extra attention paid to aboriginal 
culture and imagery is a positive thing, and one that must be steered in the 
right direction by aboriginal leaders, the risk lies in dilution of the 
indigenous identity and its being reduced to its most basic, and 
stereotypical, form for easy consumption by the masses.  
This trend can be seen in a multitude of places. The former director 
general of the Government Information Office, Pasuya Yao, adopted as his 
nickname an aboriginal given name, even though he himself is not a 
member of any of Taiwan's aboriginal groups. This in and of itself is not a 
negative thing; in fact, it could be quite positive, if the individual involved 
were a champion of aboriginal rights and a friend to the indigenous peoples 
of Taiwan. Indeed, such an ally so high up in government would be an asset. 
However, in this case, there is little evidence to suggest that the individual 
in question is in any real way an ideological ally of Taiwan's aboriginal 
peoples. Rather, he is a savvy media worker and deft manipulator of public 
opinion who chose the name because he is keenly aware of modern trends, 
and the modern trend was for aboriginal culture to enjoy a certain cachet in 
Taiwan. In choosing the name, he appears to have been hoping to 
appropriate some of the respect and admiration people are developing for 
aboriginal culture. It is not unlike the prevalence of black culture in the 
United States, or "urban culture" to use the politically correct term, being 
appropriated by white, middle-class teenagers.  
Another example can be seen in the prominent presence of aboriginal 
traditional costumes and dancing that accompanies many major events in 
Taiwan. Again, this in and of itself is not a negative thing; it helps to 
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promote indigenous culture, gives aboriginal people pride in their heritage 
and impels non-aborigines to want to learn more about the culture. 
However, it can also be a cheapening of that culture. Many, though not all, 
dances are for specific rites and rituals and, by tradition, should only be 
performed under certain strict conditions and circumstances. Many are akin 
to religious expression. When the wider society at large appropriates these 
dances, they reduce them to mere entertainment.  
Whether or not the majority of Taiwan's aboriginal people are aware 
of it, they are the holders of a very valuable commodity: their culture. It is 
therefore important that they do not allow that commodity to be reduced in 
value. Rather, it must be carefully guarded to ensure that it is treated with 
respect and honoured not only by those who hold a hereditary stake therein, 
but also by those who would appropriate it for their own use.  
In addition to those forces that would dilute aboriginal culture by 
appropriating it, there are others who completely oppose aboriginal rights on 
grounds that are ostensibly rooted in a skewed conception of equality, but 
are in reality little more than racially based. It must be noted that there is 
considerable resistance in modern Taiwan to the movement to return land 
and autonomy to the island's aboriginal peoples. Organisations such as the 
Plains Peoples Rights Association (PPRA), though hardly representative of 
the mainstream level of commitment to the matter, are nevertheless 
politically and financially powerful enough to exert considerable influence 
in the areas in which it operates, and are therefore worthy of consideration 
in any attempt to determine whether or not Taiwan is in a developmental 
position that would make self-government for its aboriginal groups a 
political reality. The group, organised in the early 1990s by non-indigenous 
businessmen residing in districts that are primarily aboriginal, is concerned 
with promoting the economic opportunities of Han Chinese residents of 
these high-mountain areas. In a country as geographically small and as 
densely populated as Taiwan, competition for land resources is fierce, 
leading to resentment over the current policy that sets land aside for 
exclusively aboriginal ownership. As a lobby group, the PPRA seeks to 
open aboriginal reserve land to free-market forces.  
Research indicates that the group was formed by businessmen in the 
motel business in Nantou County before its members used their political and 
corporate connections to create branches in Taichung, Yilan, Pingtung, and 
Taoyuan. It was initially founded as a reaction to the land tenure and 
reservation system that made it illegal for private interests to purchase land 
set aside for aboriginal peoples. Despite this prohibition, swaths of land 
were appropriated by the central government and illegal land sales took 
place, leading indigenous rights groups to launch a land recovery 
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movement. The PPRA was formed in reaction to this. Its adherents want the 
reservation land system abolished, arguing that the island's aboriginal 
peoples should have no special claim to reservation land and that Han 
Chinese interests should be allowed to develop it. Moreover, they argue for 
changing the designation of aboriginal people in the Constitution back to 
"mountain compatriots". Today, it is a lobby group that operates at the 
national level and is pressuring the central government to legalise the sale of 
aboriginal land. In reality, this organisation seeks to strike down any law 
that favours special rights for aboriginal peoples.  
Membership in the group is extensive, and has included members of 
the Han Chinese majority working in the tourist industry, officials from 
farmers' co-ops, and even elected representatives. Its methods are to appeal 
for its vision of legal equality between Han Chinese and aboriginal peoples 
living in mountainous areas, painting itself and its members as the aggrieved 
victims. The PPRA takes its rhetoric further, however, with oblique threats 
of violence if the government's special treatment of indigenous groups does 
not end.  
Although the PPRA political contacts are traditionally to the KMT, at 
least, at the central-government level, there are indications that it also enjoys 
support among members of other political parties as well, including the DPP 
and New Party. Again, the group is not representative of Taiwanese society 
at large. However, the very fact that such an organisation is allowed to exist 
in Taiwan, and to gain support at the highest levels of government, speaks 
volumes to the conditions on the island regarding attitudes toward 
aborigines. What is more telling, however, is the group's reason for being. 
While the group is clearly an institutionalised expression of an ideological 
sentiment of perceived racial superiority, it is also very much an economic 
lobby group that has a very specific policy aim: the right to buy land at 
depressed prices from poverty-stricken aborigines. The fact that an 
economic lobby group could so easily adopt rhetoric and principles akin to 
virulent racist organisations is what is so unsettling to many observers. The 
influence of the PPRA has waned in recent years since its leader fled to the 
PRC to escape prosecution on charges of corruption and bribery (Chen 
2002: 10).  
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ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Any effort to restore a marginalised population to self-sufficiency must 
include an economic component. In Taiwan, the quest of the indigenous 
peoples’ movement for economic independence has evolved from a focus 
almost entirely on forestry and agriculture to one predicated on tourism, 
especially such sub-categories as eco-tourism and cultural tourism. To 
attract Han Chinese tourists from around the island to their remote tourist 
destinations, tourism campaigns generally incorporated three basic 
attractions, forested environs, culture and food. They have found reasonable 
success in transforming villages by opening conduits for tourist dollars to 
translate into economic development.  
The development of the villages in this way began in the 1990s when 
the aboriginal movement called on educated members of the community, 
most of whom were living in the large cities, to return to the villages (Lee 
2006: 75). The reasoning behind the move was that, despite the advances 
being made by these elites in terms of indigenous rights on the legal, 
political and social fronts, very little had been accomplished to improve life 
in the villages themselves. In that time, many villages sought to improve 
their local economies by recognising that the aboriginal identity had been 
experiencing something of a renaissance in terms of public perception 
throughout Taiwan, and indeed had acquired something of a prestige, and 
putting that trend to work in moving toward economic self-sufficiency 
through the revitalisation and commodification of identity.  
One of the villages that chose to focus its efforts on reviving its 
cultural identity was Nanwang, a Pinuyumayan village in Taidong County, 
which revived a cultural ceremony known as the Monkey and Hunting 
Festival and began using it to promote village unity, strengthen cultural 
identity and derive economic benefits by opening parts of the ritual up to 
tourists. By tradition, after reaching the age of puberty, Pinuyumayan boys 
spend six months preparing for their new roles as men, leaving home to 
study under the tutelage of a tribal elder from whom they learn how to build 
houses and engage in the hunt. After this training period is over, the young 
men return home to undergo a test of manhood, in which the entire village 
takes part. Traditionally, it involves the slaughter of a monkey. This is 
followed by a three-day sojourn in the mountains—a part of the ritual not 
open to tourists—in which the young men go on a hunt. The entire village 
welcomes them back with singing and dancing. Now that the ritual is open 
to the public, the boys' simian quarry has been replaced with a straw doll 
after animal-rights activists decried what they saw as animal cruelty and 
lobbied to put an end to the Pinuyumayan tradition altogether.  
IJAPS, Vol. 7, No. 1 (January 2011)   Canadian Power-Sharing Agreements 
109 
Another example of reviving culture and repurposing it as an 
economic activity through tourism revenue is the Amis harvest festival, 
which takes place every year from July to September. With 167,700 
members, the Amis group is the largest indigenous ethnic group in Taiwan 
by population. Traditionally, the event begins with the young men of the 
tribe leaving the village to live a few days on the seashore where they spend 
the time catching fish. Young women are forbidden from interfering during 
this period of bonding and fishing, except for a certain day when they are 
allowed to bring supplies, such as wine, tobacco and betel-nuts, to the men 
as they stand their vigil. Upon completion of the task, the men return to the 
village, whereupon they are greeted with song and dance. The event is 
heavily promoted by the Taitung County Government in a way that divorces 
it from any understanding or appreciation of its social importance and 
reduces it to the level of a commodity.  
 
The 40 aboriginal tribes under the jurisdiction of the East Coast 
National Scenic Area Administration, Tourism Bureau of the 
Ministry of Transportation and Communications will launch a 
series of celebratory activities pertaining to the symbolic Amis 
cultures from 9 July to 23 August in a row. These are the most 
important annual cultural events among aborigines from 
Taitung to Hualien. It is recommended that travelers enjoy the 
pluralistic cultures of the Amis with an open mind ("The 2005 
Amis Harvest Festival in the East Coast to Start in July," 2006). 
 
Many of the dangers inherent in this commercialisation of culture are 
self-evident. For one, it risks leading to a "theme park" mentality that distils 
indigenous culture down to its most visible attributes and reduces them to 
mere ritual without consideration of the importance of the meanings behind 
the ceremonies being commodified. For another, it places such ceremonies 
under the power of market forces, as in the example of the Pinuyumayan 
monkey hunt. In that case, the monkeys were replaced by dolls to appease 
the increasingly sensitive consumers, thus adulterating the primary reason 
for the ritual: helping boys become men through a time-honoured ritual of 
physical and psychological trial.  
For another, aboriginal entrepreneurs can often be restricted to a 
narrow position on the industry chain. Travel agencies, for example, are 
often operated by Han Chinese businesspeople who themselves get a cut of 
each tour. Often, "improvements" are made so that aboriginal villages and 
ceremonies are more accessible to tourists, such as paving concrete steps 
into mountain paths and providing non-traditional, but more popular, food 
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items for paying visitors to enjoy—to say nothing of the problems of 
overcrowding, littering and disputes about how to distribute income. 
Finally, in cases where the central government gets involved in the 
sponsorship and organisation of cultural events, there is often an attempt to 
broaden the appeal by adding activities to the program, such as inviting 
performance troupes from abroad to demonstrate their own cultural 
activities. This can have the effect of creating a carnival atmosphere and 
turning a solemn cultural or religious ceremony into a circus.  
The Wulai Aboriginal Culture Village is a successful business 
enterprise that is predicated on tourists, primarily from Taipei, having an 
interest in the aboriginal way of life. There are dancing shows, native food 
restaurants and several shops selling indigenous products and products 
adorned with aboriginal motifs. Of the almost forty such shops and 
restaurants along the main street of Wulai Village, however, only one 
restaurant and one shop were owned by aborigines, even though all of the 
businesses once belonged to aborigines (Huang et al. 1994: 190). The 
Atayal people of the area, unpractised at business affairs, have allowed Han 
Chinese businessmen to displace them to meet market demand for an 
authentic aboriginal experience in the tourist area.  
One way to mitigate the negative effects of this foray into the 
economic sphere would be to promote the creation of indigenous chambers 
of commerce or business associations, giving aboriginal businesses a 
stronger voice in their own economic development and leading to a renewed 
spirit of unity. A Canadian example of such an organisation is the Labrador 
Inuit Association, which was founded in 1973 to support Inuit culture and 
protect Inuit rights to their traditional land, and its business arm the 
Labrador Inuit Development Corporation (LIDC), which was formed in 
1982 to help give the Labrador Inuit control over the local economy.  
The LIDC focused on promoting the use of traditional Inuit skills in 
ways that diversified the economy and improved living conditions by 
providing training and jobs on the north shore of Labrador, whose economy 
had previously been dominated by the fishing industry and propped up by 
government subsidies. One of its first projects was to hold a commercial 
hunt of George River caribou. After a few years, the corporation obtained a 
license to sell the meat throughout the province, and then outside of 
Newfoundland, which led to the construction of a processing and packaging 
plant that provided jobs for several locals. In addition to providing the 
Labrador Inuit with invaluable experience in sales and marketing, the 
venture led to the region's first meat inspection service certified by the 
federal government.  
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More recently, the LIDC has diversified the local economy,          
forming ancillary companies and subsidiaries, and engaging in several 
entrepreneurial projects. It has managed to attract investors by building a 
strong equity position through the judicious creation of partnerships with 
Canadian corporations. One of these joint ventures, and one which 
illustrates how the LIDC manages to create employment opportunities and 
generate economic benefits by merging the traditional Inuit skill set with the 
demands of the modern world, is the Pan Arctic Inuit Logistics project. The 
company, which is contracted by the federal government to man outposts 
throughout Canada's north, operates and maintains the radar line in the 
arctic called the North Warning System. LIDC partners in the venture 
include several like institutions, including Kitikmeot Corporation, Inuvialuit 
Corporate Group and Makivik Corporation.  
 
 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Given the differences between the Canadian and Taiwanese examples, their 
unique historical foundations and the different cultural, legal and 
developmental state of affairs, the wholesale adoption of the Canadian 
system would neither be realistic nor prudent. However, the Canadian 
example holds many lessons, both in what had worked in the past and what 
has not worked. Moreover, the Canadian mechanism is designed to 
accommodate a certain degree of flexibility due to the heterogeneity of the 
players involved. ROC policymakers would do well to turn their eyes to the 
Canadian government's Federal Policy Guide promulgated by Indian Affairs 
and Northern Development on the issue of aboriginal self-government, not 
for a blueprint, but for an understanding of why certain negotiation 
objectives and methods of power-transfer were successful.  
The ROC government must, first and foremost, recognise the 
inalienable right of the Formosan aborigines to self-government. There 
should be no question on this matter, and indeed it should be enshrined in no 
uncertain terms in the Constitution. International law provides as a 
fundamental element the concept of self-determination. This began as an 
understanding vis-à-vis the right of a nation to self-determination in regards 
to other nations in the world (for example, in response to concerns about 
colonialism) but has come, over time, to include the rights of aboriginal 
groups to have a say in their own fate. However, this concept remains a 
vague one and its terms are relatively undefined. Certain concepts, such as 
what groups qualify for consideration, and what form and extent the 
mechanism of self-rule takes, remain open to interpretation.  
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In the modern era of globalisation and multilateralism, the world has, 
for the most part, moved beyond the Westphalian model and towards what 
proponents of the international system hope will be a more equitable, 
responsible pattern of international interaction and governance (Anaya 
2000: 15). Even today, international law has taken on more prominence in 
issues of accountable governance, and one of the basic tenets of 
international law is that governments shall demonstrate a respect for the 
human rights of the governed. There is precedent for the inclusion of ethnic 
and linguistic minorities in this equation.  
Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
states: 
 
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities 
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied 
the right, in community with the other members of their group, 
to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own 
religion, or to use their own language. 
 
This, in conjunction with Article 1, would seem, on the surface of it, to 
provide a legislative mandate for aboriginal self-government in the highest 
tiers of international law.  
 
Article 1 states:  
 
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue  
of that right they freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.  
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their 
natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any 
obligations arising out of international economic co-
operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and 
international law. In no case may a people be deprived of  
its own means of subsistence.  
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those 
having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-
Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the 
realisation of the right of self-determination, and shall 
respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations.  
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There is a precedent for aboriginal peoples using the right of 
individual petition to obtain a ruling from the Human Rights Committee on 
perceived violations of Article 27. Moreover, Article 14 of the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 169 concerning indigenous and 
tribal peoples in independent countries states the following: 
  
1. The rights of ownership and possession of the peoples 
concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy 
shall be recognised. In addition, measures shall be taken  
in appropriate cases to safeguard the right of the peoples 
concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, 
but to which they have traditionally had access for their 
subsistence and traditional activities. Particular attention 
shall be paid to the situation of nomadic peoples and  
shifting cultivators in this respect.  
2. Governments shall take steps as necessary to identify the 
lands which the peoples concerned traditionally occupy,  
and to guarantee effective protection of their rights of 
ownership and possession.  
3. Adequate procedures shall be established within the national 
legal system to resolve land claims by the peoples 
concerned.  
 
Clearly, there is more than token attention paid in the international 
system to the issue. The question remains, however, whether the current 
state of international law concerning human rights can be used as anything 
more than a blunt instrument to protect the rights of indigenous peoples, and 
whether individual governments unwilling to comply can be effectively 
coerced by the international community, providing there is sufficient 
political currency for such efforts. In addition, Taiwan's unprecedented 
political situation vis-à-vis the international community presents a host of 
unique problems that further call into question the applicability of 
international law. Suffice to say that the rights of self-rule of indigenous 
peoples around the world are recognised in principle.  
Though provided for in international law, this concept must be 
enshrined in the ROC Constitution. Unfortunately, constitutional change is 
not so simple in Taiwan, especially in the current political climate, but it is 
imperative that this right to self-determination be enumerated among the 
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rights delineated in the nation's prime law. Moreover, the Constitution must 
reflect the fact that this right is properly to be expressed in the form of duly 
negotiated treaties between authorised aboriginal community groups and the 
central government. Once these basic conceptions are expressed in the 
nation's constitution—the very codification of a nation's identity—it must be 
accepted by mainstream opinion that the indigenous persons of the island 
have the right to chart their own political course as regards matters of their 
own internal administration, and in ways that are consistent with their own 
cultures, languages and unique identities, and above all, with their special 
relationship to their lands.  
Moreover, the government must be committed to the principle that 
these rights are enforceable though the nation’s judicial system, meaning it 
must be more than mere lip service. Indeed, the courts system in Taiwan is 
particularly weak. The Chinese culture that is prevalent in Taiwan tends to 
promote harmony over equity, and unfortunately the courts system reflects 
this. However, it is slowly improving, and there will doubtless come a day 
when the judicial system and the people of the island are no longer afraid of 
costly, time consuming litigation on the matter of rights provided that it 
returns valuable results, for only then will the courts take their place as a 
pillar of government equal in importance and responsibility to the legislative 
and executive. As with any right, there will be differing opinions on the 
nature and scope of aboriginal rights to self-governance, and the 
responsibility of settling these matters rests with the judicial system in cases 
where the parties involved reach impasse.  
Naturally, litigation must be understood to be the last course of action 
when other techniques have failed, such as negotiation. The treaty process 
which would involve good-faith negotiation between aboriginal groups and 
government must naturally take precedence, which is why constitutional 
protections of the right to self-government are so important.  
It must also be accepted that aboriginal governments, once 
implemented, will have to work closely with other levels of government in 
Taiwan, both laterally and from within the hierarchy of government. 
Genuine effort must be made to ensure the proper and efficient functioning 
of such relationships geared toward the success of the nation and its 
experiment in aboriginal self-rule, with a priority on cooperation over 
competition.  
Not just the central government, but county and city governments as 
well must be committed to the success of the process, as their participation 
in the negotiation process will be of equal importance. Many of the matters 
under negotiation will fall within the jurisdictional boundaries of these sub-
central governance units, and the outcome of talks will necessarily impact 
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them as well. For that reason, they must have representation in appropriate 
talks and be signatory to the result thereof.  
It is important the persons entering the treaty negotiations with the 
central government on behalf of a group or groups be authorised by the 
group they profess to represent, and that a continuity of support extend 
throughout the process—a process, it should be noted, that could take years, 
if not decades, in each individual case. It is therefore incumbent upon the 
aboriginal organisations involved that prior to entering into negotiations, all 
affected individuals are satisfied that they are being duly represented. This 
calls for a degree of intra-tribal unity that, to date, has been rare in Taiwan. 
This is an issue that rests solely with the groups themselves, and the central 
government cannot become involved in hand-picking representatives with 
which to enter into negotiations, lest the entire process lose legitimacy.  
As in the Canadian example, it must be understood that the right of 
autonomy does not imply the right of succession, or to the creation of 
sovereign independent states. Quite the opposite, in fact: the creation of self-
governing aboriginal jurisdictions will help ensure that the island's 
aboriginal population work in concert with, and not in isolation from, the 
rest of Taiwan, and that they contribute their unique history, traditions and 
viewpoints to the polity.  
Perhaps one of the best lessons Canada has to teach falls only 
peripherally within the realm of aboriginal self-government, but is related to 
constitutional law, and that is the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
This document binds all levels of government and supersedes all legislation 
in the nation, applying equally to all individuals, aboriginal and non-
aboriginal. As with all treaties, those realising self-government agreements 
must adopt the Charter to govern their operation. Indeed, the Charter itself 
includes a clause guaranteeing its applicability in cases of aboriginal rights 
and self-government treaties. The adoption in Taiwan of a Charter similar to 
Canada's would be unprecedented for such a young Asian democracy, but it 
is not outside the realm of possibility.  
This is not to imply that the process would be a quick or painless one; 
even in Canada, it was only through a difficult period of nearly three 
decades of constitutional mayhem marked by failed drafts, and a series of 
referenda, that the current state of affairs was arrived at, with the central 
primacy of the Charter. One of the most important aspects of the Charter is 
its directive of having a review by the judiciary overrule the actions of 
parliament. Likewise, the adoption of such a model in Taiwan would help 
temper the power of the legislature and empower the currently toothless 
judiciary as an organ to ensure that the individual rights of all Taiwanese are 
held supreme. In Canada, the adoption of the Charter created something of 
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an activist supreme court. This development, if duplicated in Taiwan, would 
not necessarily be amiss. However, since a previous round of constitutional 
re-engineering essentially kept the issue of aboriginal rights off the agenda, 
and made further constitutional revision subject to ratification by the 
Legislature and the people of the island, this created a situation where any 
further changes to the Constitution to include sections on the rights to self-
determination of indigenous peoples would be even harder to realise.  
Given the fact that Taiwan sub-ethnic groups each have their own 
unique cultures, languages, and circumstances, it must be understood that no 
single self-government model can be imposed on each. For that reason, 
extensive negotiations for each case are paramount in order to ensure that an 
equitable form of government is arrived at for each group that takes into 
account its unique political, legal, historical, and social state of affairs.  
Moreover, the government must realise that self-governing units must 
be given wide discretion and the appropriate authority to exercise their right 
of autonomy. The purposes of the negotiations therefore are not to be 
bogged down in semantic or legal arguments over the meaning of the term 
self-government, but must cover the nuts and bolts of how administrative 
mandate is to be exercised. To that end, government negotiators must 
relinquish certain rights to the governmental unit being negotiated, such as 
the right to define certain elements that are integral to the aboriginal group 
in question. These elements may include issues of adoption and child 
welfare, marriage laws, definitions of group membership, protection of the 
group's language and culture, education within the jurisdiction, and the 
provision of health and social services. They must also, by definition, 
include the makeup of the governance mechanisms, such as the selection of 
leaders, so long as these follow democratic principles of universal 
suffrage—a defining element of the national identity as a democratic 
country.  
As sub-central governmental units, the new jurisdictions to be created 
must have the mandate to enact certain laws and define certain offenses, 
such as the type normally covered by the nation's other, non-aboriginal sub-
central government units. Moreover, it is absolutely essential that aboriginal 
tribunals or courts be empowered to adjudicate such offenses, and policing 
units be set up to enforce the jurisdiction's laws. Internal issues such as the 
delineation of property rights, the handling of estates, land-use and zoning 
issues and management of natural resources must be squarely in the hands 
of the aboriginal governments. Only in this way can traditional activities 
and customs, which may or may not involve agriculture, hunting, fishing 
and trapping, be protected as aspects of the way of life, and therefore the 
very identity, of the people in question.  
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The negotiation process must include the provision of detailed 
arrangements with respect to issues that may overlap with central-
government purview, such as taxation, especially property taxes, 
management of group assets and the operation of public works and 
infrastructure projects. Issues such as public transportation, housing, and 
business licensing for enterprises on aboriginal lands should be recognised 
aboriginal responsibilities, although they may overlap with and therefore 
must be consistent with adjacent administrative units.  
Just as there are a number of areas in which aboriginal self-
governmental units should hold jurisdiction, and others where detailed 
delineation of responsibilities must be negotiated, so too are there areas that 
would naturally remain within the purview of the central government. These 
issues tend to have an impact at the national level and go beyond 
influencing only the indigenous inhabitants of the sub-central administrative 
unit. Issues in this category may include, but are not restricted to, the 
enforcement of national criminal laws and punishment for federal crimes, 
the operation of penitentiaries and emergency preparedness. In these cases, 
the primary responsibility should rest with the central or applicable county 
governments, and these laws would prevail in cases of overlap.  
In the Canadian example, these issues also include such things as 
environmental protection initiatives, pollution prevention, and fisheries and 
migratory birds conservation. However, it is understood that many of these 
issues have proven in the Taiwanese context to be thorny, and have the 
potential to be abused in an effort to create roadblocks to progress. This is 
especially true on the appropriation of the environmental impact assessment 
mechanism, which is all too easily abused for partisan political obstruction. 
Therefore, good-faith negotiation and cooperation is absolutely essential in 
such matters, and an equitable dispute-resolution mechanism should be 
considered (prior to the recourse of the courts), to ensure appropriate 
administration in such areas.  
In addition, there are a number of administrative areas where there 
exist no convincing arguments for power-sharing. In these areas, it is 
important for the central government to remain the primary legislative 
authority. These normally include issues such as national sovereignty, 
national defence and international relations. In practical terms, these have 
impacts in areas such as military service, foreign policy, national security 
(especially the administration of armed-forces bases), negotiation of 
international treaties, and issues related to immigration, refugees and 
naturalisation.  
Moreover, the government cannot relinquish its mandate to oversee 
such aspects of governance as the active management of and regulatory 
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authority over the economy, fiscal policy, currency controls, administration 
of the banking system, trade policy including negotiation of free-trade 
agreements, and protection of intellectual property rights. Lawmaking 
authority in areas such as the national health system, administration of the 
post, operation of national-level transportation systems and broadcasting 
shall likewise not be open to negotiation and should rest within the 
exclusive purview of the central government.  
On the issue of implementing the results of successful negotiations, 
there are several mechanisms that, following the Canadian example, could 
be employed in Taiwan as well. The most common of these of course is  
the treaty system. The ROC government must be prepared to confer 
constitutional protection to treaties negotiated and completed between its 
negotiators and those of the claimant aboriginal associations. As discussed 
earlier, a constitutional amendment would be necessary before this can 
become a feasible reality. By their very nature, treaties produce compulsory 
responsibilities on the part of both parties, and must therefore have the force 
of constitutional mandate behind them. Since this carries implications for 
future generations, it is imperative therefore that matters under the 
protection of the Constitution include the clear definition of aboriginal 
jurisdictional responsibilities and those that fall within the purview of the 
central and appropriate county governments, an unambiguous description of 
the persons to be subject to the treaty and the geographical area to which it 
applies, and the force of constitutional protection to the laws created by the 
aboriginal self-governance unit and its accountability to the people it serves.  
Other issues of a provisional nature, including such things as funding 
provisions and welfare service implementation details, do not require the 
full force of constitutional protection, so a clear definition of what is and is 
not designed to be flexible and subject to changing circumstances must be 
made. These issues, important as they are, are not treaty rights per se, but 
can be considered interim arrangements in the provision of such rights.  
Other mechanisms for self-government can be implemented, such as 
through the passage of legislation, the signing of contracts or the agreement 
on memorandums of understanding. For example, legislation could give the 
force of law to signed contracts on technical or provisional issues toward the 
establishment of final self-governing units. Non-binding memorandums of 
understanding, though they do not have the legal protection of contracts, can 
be employed to signal a commitment to the power-sharing process, and are 
therefore also important mechanisms toward that end.  
 In geographical terms, it must be understood that the aboriginal self-
governmental units will, in all likelihood, include jurisdiction over non-
indigenous members of the population, and the matter of whose authority 
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they fall under should be clearly addressed. In some cases, the aboriginal 
self-government will want to exercise territorial powers over the negotiated 
area, as discussed earlier, while in other situations it may the case that an 
asymmetrical mechanism is adopted in which aboriginal governmental units 
are restricted to administration of the group's members exclusively. This 
issue is more difficult than it may at first seem, and serious consideration 
must be given to solving jurisdictional problems before they arise. For 
example, in the former case, a way must be provided for non-members to 
have some measure of input.  
In many ways, the successful negotiation of a treaty or other legally 
binding agreement is just the beginning of the process, as the self-
government stipulation contained therein must be applied. Therefore, it is 
important that these issues of transition be dealt with adequately, in some 
cases to the extent of being part of the negotiating process itself. In order to 
ensure that execution of the new governmental unit does not become 
obstructed by legal ambiguity, these changeover measures should be clearly 
laid out. For example, some aboriginal groups may want to gradually phase-
in administrative responsibility over a period of time, not only to ensure a 
smooth transfer of power but also to train personnel and solve logistical 
problems. To what degree it is possible, these needs should be anticipated 
and accounted for during the process of negotiation.  
Part of this gradual transfer of authority will be the fiduciary 
obligations that the ROC government has to the island’s aboriginal peoples. 
As negotiated power-sharing agreements take effect and aboriginal councils 
gradually assume a greater administrative role, it is important that this  
be cushioned by ongoing central government provision as per its 
responsibilities, only reduced gradually as its responsibilities are taken over 
by the created governmental unit. The process must not be conceived of as 
one in which the ROC government is abdicating its responsibilities to the 
island’s aboriginal peoples, but as one in which those responsibilities are 
being redefined and expressed in less paternalistic ways. There will be cases 
in which the created governments and the central government have 
concurrent obligations in the same areas, but in situations where the central 
government has given over control to self-governmental units, it is 
important that those units likewise assume the funding responsibilities.  
For this reason, it is imperative that the same accountability 
mechanisms that are in place to ensure existing local-level governments 
fulfil their responsibilities to their constituents be instituted to protect the 
rights and livelihoods of the aboriginal constituents of new, negotiated self-
governmental units. Moreover, the operation of the aboriginal government 
must be accountable for political actions, and its operation must be subject 
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to its own internal basic law, one that is transparent and freely available not 
only to its constituent members but to other governments and parties that 
will realistically interact with that government.  
Naturally, the new governments’ financial record-keeping practices 
must be consistent with central-government laws and regulations, and 
should be similar to those mechanisms in place for other sub-central 
governments. This is especially important in such areas as public audits and 
transparency of public spending. Just as in the case of county and municipal 
governments around the island, aboriginal governments would be made 
accountable to the legislature for spending monies provided by the central 
government, and the legislature must be satisfied that the public funds were 
utilised in the proper manner. It will be the responsibility of the aboriginal 
governments to eventually assume the responsibility of providing for its 
constituents the level of minimum basic services enjoyed by the population 
at large. This is not to say that such services will be identical—the situation 
will vary from area to area, and from group to group. However, a minimum 
of welfare provision and basic services must be made available, and to this 
end, the aboriginal governments must eventually assume the responsibility 
for raising funds, through taxation and other methods, to be disbursed in this 
manner.  
Finally, any agreements, contracts or treaties successfully negotiated 
must be properly ratified. Following the Canadian example where the 
executive branch is the ratifying body, the ROC Executive Yuan could be 
the body to ratify cases of memoranda of understanding, whereas with 
treaties and other contracts involving legislation, the Legislative Yuan 
would be responsible for providing the governmental stamp of approval. On 
the claimants' side, the aboriginal group committee must have a mechanism 
to ratify the agreement and the government should be provided with 
evidence that the indigenous group involved has consented to the negotiated 
agreement and that each member to whom the treaty will apply has had a 
chance to participate in the ratification process, thereby solidifying the 
applicability of the deal reached and leaving little question of its binding 
authority.  
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